Formosa’s Future 　10.27.1971

By Ming-Min Peng

This article was published in The New York Times, October 27, 1971, Pg. 47. At that time, Ming-Min Peng was in exile in the U.S. and was a senior research scholar at the Center for Chinese Studies of the University of Michigan. He was formerly chairman of the department of political science at National Taiwan University and an adviser to the Chinese delegation to the United Nations.

The U.N. decision seating Peking and expelling Taipei--plus President Nixon’s proposed visit to the mainland--underscore the tangle of the Formosan issue. And now as world leaders finally admit the absurdities of Nationalist Chinese fantasies, a new myth emerges: that Formosa has been and must be an integral part of China, and that in order for China to achieve full sovereignty she must annex Formosa.

In reality, Formosa’s connection to China before 1895 was so loose as to be almost nominal and relations were tumultuous. In the last 75 years the island has had fewer than four years of union with China, 1945-1949, and those were by no means the happiest in Formosan history. In 1947 an uprising occurred which resulted in the massacre of over 20,000 Formosan leaders. Native Formosans are of Chinese extraction, but have shared centuries of experience unique to them and have developed their own identity. Joined after the Second World War by over 2,000,000 continental Chinese now also cut off for more than 20 years from the experience of the new China, all the people in Formosa now have no more connection to China than Americans have to Britain. Moreover, Formosa’s legal status has been undetermined since 1945.

Furthermore, China’s emotional claims to Formosa have nothing to do with its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Early in this century, when China was struggling to attain full sovereignty, Formosa was never an issue. Mao Tse-tung himself, drawing an analogy with Korea, expressed his readiness to support an independent Formosa. It was only after 1949, when the exiled Nationalists used the island as a base for aggression against China, that Peking’s attitude toward Formosa became belligerent.

Certain basic points must be kept in mind in seeking a solution to the Formosan problem. First, the U.S. cannot maintain its military presence in Formosa permanently. Second, China cannot simply annex Formosa. Third, the Nationalists cannot maintain their rule in Formosa on such an absurd basis. Fourth, the unique history and identity of the people on Formosa cannot be disregarded, nor their aspiration to decide their own destiny denied.

Many Chinese in the U.S. still insist that Formosa must be a part of China, which in fact means rule either by the Peking or the Taipei Government. Yet they themselves have chosen to live under neither Chinese regime and have never considered Formosa to be their homeland.

The Chinese must learn to distinguish ethnic origin and culture from politics and law and to discard their archaic obsession to claim anyone of Chinese ancestry as legally Chinese, however far removed from China.

They must stop vilifying as traitors those who desire self-determination and understand that one can be proud of his Chinese heritage and still choose not to be subject to government by China.

The real issue is not independence for Formosa but self-determination for the people there. And the Formosan people want to live in the most friendly association with the Chinese people and would spare no effort to establish the closest economic, commercial, cultural and even political ties with China.

Any settlement of the sovereignty over Formosa must come through peaceful negotiations in which the people of Formosa are fully and effectively represented. No one from outside may dictate to Formosans to whom they should belong. Neither Peking nor Washington can speak for them. The present regime in Taipei never has spoken legitimately for the majority on Formosa. It cannot do so unless it undergoes a basic structural change and the Formosan majority is represented effectively at every level.